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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 15-2065
________________
MICHAEL A. WHALEY;
VALERIE M. ROBINSON,
Appellants
v.
LEWIS D. SCHILIRO, Secretary; DELAWARE DEPARTMENT
OF SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY, Division of State Police
________________
On Appeal from the District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D. Del. No. 1-12-cv-00633)
District Judge: Honorable Leonard P. Stark
________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 15, 2016
Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 16, 2016)

________________
OPINION*
________________
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

This is an action alleging race discrimination and retaliation. Appellants Michael
Whaley and Valerie Robinson, both African-American, were Delaware State Police
officers. After an investigation conducted by the Delaware Division of State Police
uncovered evidence they fraudulently overstated the number of hours worked, Whaley
and Robinson were charged with theft by false pretense and official misconduct,
misdemeanor charges to which they pled guilty. Subsequently the officers filed suit
against Michael Schiliro, the Delaware Secretary of Homeland Safety and Security,
contending the investigation had a racially discriminatory and retaliatory motive. The
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Schiliro. We will affirm. 1
I.
The Delaware Division of State Police received information suggesting that some
state police officers were inflating the number of hours they worked while performing
overtime “off-duty” assignments.2 Upon investigation, the Division concluded there
were grounds for criminal prosecution. The matter was referred to the state Attorney
General who conducted a criminal investigation and brought charges against Whaley and
Robinson.3 The officers pled guilty to misdemeanor charges of theft by false pretense, 11
Del. C. § 843, and official misconduct, 11 Del. C. § 1211(3). Under the plea agreements,
1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
As part of their duties, Delaware state police may be required to perform certain “offduty” assignments that are compensated at overtime rates. One of those duties—which
Whaley and Robinson were engaged in while overstating their hours—includes
transportation of individuals subject to an involuntary psychiatric commitment.
3
A third state police officer, who is Caucasian and is not involved in this lawsuit, also
pled guilty to identical charges and paid restitution and fines in the amount of $789.12
and $500, respectively Several other officers were also investigated by the Division, but
charges were not brought against them because of insufficient evidence.
2

Whaley and Robinson paid restitution and fines,4 forfeited their police training
certifications, and agreed not to work in any law enforcement capacity in Delaware again.
They retired with full pension and health benefits.
Following retirement, Whaley and Robinson sued Michael Schiliro in his official
capacity, because his department had ultimate authority over the state police. Whaley
and Robinson alleged the Division of State Police discriminated and retaliated against
them on the basis of race in violation of federal and state statutes.5 The District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of Schiliro finding no evidence of a discriminatory
or retaliatory motive.
II. 6
A.
Whaley and Robinson contend Schiliro’s department violated their civil rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which proscribes discrimination on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C.
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Whaley paid restitution of $2,187.11 and fines of $932.95. Robinson paid restitution of
$2,000 and fines of $1,500.
5
Whaley and Robinson alleged violation of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Delaware
Discrimination in Employment Act, 19 Del. C. § 711(a).
6
We review a district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. EEOC v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448 (3d Cir. 2015). Summary judgment may be
appropriately granted where there “is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “To be
material, a fact must have the potential to alter the outcome of the case.” NAACP v. N.
Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011). When considering
whether summary judgment is appropriate, “we view the underlying facts and all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion.” Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). “An
inference based upon a speculation or conjecture does not create a material factual
dispute sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287
(3d Cir. 2014).
3

§ 1981(a). They admitted they sued Schiliro only because he headed the department
which controlled the state police—in other words, they sued him in his official capacity.
“But a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the
official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a
suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)
(citations omitted). Because Whaley and Robinson press their claims against a state
actor, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights
guaranteed in Section 1981.” Jett v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989);
McGovern v. Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2009). Although they failed to plead a
claim under Section 1983, the District Court analyzed their Section 1981 claim under
Section 1983, and we do so as well.
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution bars claims under
Section 1983 against state actors unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity.
Here, the parties do not dispute that the Department of Safety and Homeland Security is a
state agency for sovereign immunity purposes, and Delaware has not waived its
sovereign immunity. See Del. Dep’t of Health and Soc. Servs. v. Sheppard, 864 A.2d 929
(Del. 2004); see also Neeley v. Samis, 183 F. Supp. 2d 672, 678 (D. Del. 2002).
Whaley and Robinson attempt to avoid this legal barrier by contending they sued
Secretary Schiliro in his official and individual capacities. Although individual suits
against government officials are not barred by sovereign immunity, see MCI Telecomm.
Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503, 506 (3d Cir. 2001), they did not plead a claim
against Schiliro individually and we cannot infer one from their Complaint. Even if we
4

could infer an individual claim, the record is devoid of any evidence Schiliro was
personally involved in the investigation. Whaley’s and Robinson’s theory of individual
liability against Schiliro is based solely on his position as ultimate head of an agency
which controls the Division of State Police. But a suit against a government official in a
civil rights action “cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”
See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005); MCI Telecomm. Corp., 271
F.3d at 506.
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that Whaley’s and Robinson’s
Section 1981 claims and Section 1983 claims are barred by sovereign immunity.
B.
Whaley and Robinson also contend they were discriminated and retaliated against
on the basis of their race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq., and the Delaware Discrimination in Employment Act (“DDEA”), 19 Del.
C. § 711(a).7 Title VII and the DDEA both prevent discrimination by an employer on the
basis of race. Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 212 (3d Cir. 2015);
Schuster v. Derocili, 775 A.2d 1029, 1033 (Del. 2001). We analyze these claims under
the same framework, using the burden-shifting scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). See Schuster, 775 A.2d at 1033; Riner v.
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Robinson conceded in her memorandum of law in opposition to summary judgment that
she was not asserting claims under Title VII or the Delaware Discrimination in
Employment Act because she did not file an administrative charge of discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Delaware Department of Labor.
But the District Court ruled on those claims, and she appears to assert them on appeal.
We need not decide whether there has been a waiver because we conclude those claims
would fail even if they were not waived.
5

Nat’l Cash Register, 434 A.2d 375, 376 (Del. 1981).
We agree with the District Court that Whaley and Robinson have presented no
evidence that could support a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. Makky v.
Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008); Moore v. Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d
Cir. 2006). Beyond their conjecture, they presented no evidence they were investigated
and charged with crimes because of their race. See Halsey 750 F.3d at 287. On the
contrary, the record demonstrates they were charged with crimes because they were
violating the law.
IV.
We will affirm the grant of summary judgment to defendant.

6

